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THE COMPANY AND ITS DIRECTORS AS  
CO-CONSPIRATORS 
In Nagase Singapore Pte Ltd v Ching Kai Huat and Lim Leong 
Huat v Chip Hup Hup Kee Construction Pte Ltd, the High 
Court of Singapore affirmed the proposition that a company 
may, like a natural person, conspire with its director to inflict 
harm on a third person even if the latter is its “directing mind 
and will”. In both cases, the courts’ focus was directed at a 
conceptual enquiry, ie, whether a company, whose “mind” is 
the same as that of its director, could properly be said to have 
“combined” or “agreed” to conspire. This article argues, 
however, that this focus is misplaced. By focusing on the 
corporate form, the courts have inadvertently overlooked the 
policy concerns underlying the enquiry. In each case, the real 
issue before the court was whether there were grounds for 
imposing tortious liability on a director for what was 
essentially the company’s wrongdoing (ie, breach of 
contract). For this purpose, the relevant legal principle is 
found in the leading decision of Said v Butt, which lays down 
the presumptive rule that a director acting on the company’s 
behalf does not incur tortious liability if he has acted bona 
fide within the scope of his authority. Its primary concern is 
to enable directors and officers to discharge their duties 
without the burden of having to defend ill-founded suits. 
LEE Pey Woan∗ 
LLB (Hons) (London), BCL (Oxford); 
Barrister (Middle Temple), Advocate & Solicitor (Singapore); 
Associate Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University. 
I. Introduction 
1 Every law student is taught in the introductory company law 
class that a company is a legal entity with its own personality. From this 
fundamental premise springs a wealth of consequences. A company may 
own property, sue and be sued in its own name, enter into contracts, 
and generally assume responsibilities independently of its owners and 
controllers. Given the myriad ways in which a company asserts its 
separate personhood, it seems only a short and entirely logical step to 
conclude that a company may, like a natural person, conspire with 
                                                                       
∗ The author is grateful to Professor Adrian Briggs for his helpful comments on an 
earlier draft of this article. All errors are the author’s own. 
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another to inflict harm on a third person. This, indeed, was 
unequivocally affirmed by two recent decisions of the High Court of 
Singapore, viz, Nagase Singapore Pte Ltd v Ching Kai Huat1 (“Nagase”) 
and Lim Leong Huat v Chip Hup Hup Kee Construction Pte Ltd2 (“Lim 
Leong Huat”). 
2 But in neither decision was this considered a straightforward 
conclusion. The complication lay in a unique feature shared by both 
cases, ie, that the alleged conspiracy was perpetrated by the company 
and a director who was also its alter ego. This gave rise to a conceptual 
conundrum: since the tort of conspiracy3 requires proof of an 
agreement or combination, can this element realistically be established 
when the mind of the company is really that of its alter ego or its 
“directing mind and will”?4 Or more simply, can two legal persons who 
share one and the same mind conspire? In Nagase, the High Court held 
that these questions presented no insuperable difficulty because the 
possibility of such complicity had already been implicitly accepted by 
the Singapore Court of Appeal in an earlier decision.5 And in Lim Leong 
Huat, it was emphasised that the separate legal personality of the 
company amply justified this conclusion.6 
3 This article contends that both Nagase and Lim Leong Huat took 
too narrow an approach in focusing on the tort of conspiracy. Although 
both decisions were right in rejecting the conceptual impediment to 
such liability, they did not, with respect, sufficiently address the reasons 
that would justify the imposition of tortious liability on the director. It 
is important to note that the conspiracies alleged in both Nagase and 
Lim Leong Huat related to the company’s breach of contract.7 This being 
                                                                       
1 The case was decided in two judgments: see [2007] 3 SLR 265 and [2008] 1 SLR 80. 
2 [2009] 2 SLR 318. 
3 The tort of conspiracy comprises two forms, viz, simple conspiracy and conspiracy 
by unlawful means. Simple conspiracy is made out if two or more parties entered 
into an agreement or combined with the predominant intention to harm the 
claimant. For unlawful means conspiracy, however, it is not necessary to prove that 
the conspirators acted with the predominant intention to cause injury. Once the 
use of unlawful means is established, it suffices if the injury to the claimant is one 
of their intended purposes: Quah Kay Tee v Ong & Co [1997] 1 SLR 390 at  
[45]–[46]. This article is mainly concerned with the latter form of conspiracy as a 
breach of contract may be regarded as a form of “unlawful means” for purposes of 
the conspiracy tort; cf A Dugdale & M Jones, Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 19th Ed, 2006) at para 25-128. 
4 Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd [1915] AC 705 at 713. 
5 Chew Kong Huat v Ricwil (Singapore) Ptd Ltd [2000] 1 SLR 385. 
6 See para 17 of this article. 
7 This can only be surmised in Lim Leong Huat v Chip Hup Hup Kee Construction Pte 
Ltd, the facts of which were rather sketchy. The judgment stated that the claimant 
had alleged that the director had conspired with the company to withhold the 
repayment of a loan made by the claimant to the company: see [2009] 2 SLR 318 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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the case, the company’s own liability was not in issue. Since the company 
contracted in its own name, the primary liability for breach resides with 
the company,8 not the agent who authorised or procured it. Instead, the 
main issue in each case was whether there were grounds for imposing 
tortious liability on a director for what was essentially the company’s 
wrongdoing. To hold that it is conceptually permissible for a company 
to conspire with its director does not explain why a director should be 
so liable. Some constraining principle must necessarily be at work. If it 
were otherwise, a director is potentially liable for tortious conspiracy 
every time he makes a decision on the company’s behalf that results in 
damage to a third party. That surely cannot be right. 
4 The aim of this article is to examine and clarify the basis upon 
which personal liability could properly be imposed on a director 
involved in the company’s decision to breach a contract. It argues that 
the relevant legal principle is found in the leading decision of Said v 
Butt,9 which lays down the presumptive rule that a director acting on the 
company’s behalf does not incur tortious liability if he has acted bona 
fide within the scope of his authority. Its primary concern is to enable 
directors and officers to discharge their duties without the burden of 
having to defend ill-founded suits. Its protection is, however, limited to 
those who have acted in a bona fide manner within the scope of their 
authority. Further, its application is generally confined to instances 
where a director has participated in a company’s contractual breach, and 
is therefore irrelevant where the director is implicated in a company’s 
tort. In light of that, it is respectfully submitted that the focal points of 
the reasoning in both Nagase and Lim Leong Huat appear to have been 
somewhat misplaced. Since both decisions were concerned with a 
director’s liability for his company’s breach of contract, the rule in Said v 
Butt should have been the thrust of the legal analysis in each case. 
Unfortunately, the courts had, by approaching the issue as one 
pertaining only to legal concepts, bypassed the opportunity to expound 
the principle in Said v Butt. 
II. The principle in Said v Butt 
5 At common law, it is well settled that a director who authorises 
a company’s breach of contract does not thereby incur tortious liability 
                                                                                                                               
at [5]. Presumably, this alleged loan had arisen as a contractual arrangement, the 
non-repayment of which constituted a contractual breach. 
8 Since the company has primary liability, it is not relevant to consider the 
company’s vicarious liability, at least not immediately. But as we shall see in para 9 
of this article, questions on the company’s vicarious liability do arise if it is 
eventually decided that a director is a co-conspirator or had unlawfully induced the 
company’s breach of contract. 
9 [1920] 2 KB 497. 
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for the breach unless he has conducted himself otherwise than as the 
company’s agent. This was established in Said v Butt,10 a case in which 
the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, the chairman and managing 
director of a company, had unlawfully procured or induced the breach 
of a contract between the plaintiff and the company. The plaintiff had 
twice applied in his own name for a ticket to watch a new play at the 
theatre owned by the company. The company, however, had refused to 
sell the ticket to him as he had previously made serious and unfounded 
charges against the defendant and other officials of the company. As a 
result, the plaintiff resorted to asking a friend, one P, to buy a ticket on 
his behalf and P succeeded in doing so. When the plaintiff turned up at 
the theatre, he was ejected by the theatre’s attendants acting under the 
defendant’s instructions. On these facts, the court rejected the plaintiff ’s 
claim for wrongful inducement of breach. The ticket sale to P did not 
constitute a binding contract between the plaintiff and the company 
because the company was entitled to decide, and did make it plain, that 
it would not contract with the plaintiff. Nevertheless, McCardie J then 
went on to consider whether the plaintiff ’s claim could be sustained on 
the assumption that the contract had subsisted. The learned judge held 
that it could not. The governing principle stated by McCardie J was:11 
… that if a servant acting bona fide within the scope of his authority 
procures or causes the breach of a contract between his employer and 
a third person, he does not thereby become liable to an action of tort 
at the suit of the person whose contract has thereby been broken. 
6 Although Said v Butt was concerned with a director’s liability 
for inducing the company’s breach of contract, the same principle has 
been applied to protect agents or directors from liability for conspiring 
with the company to breach its contracts.12 Two reasons underpin the 
rule in Said v Butt. The first may be understood as an application of the 
“identification doctrine”.13 Under this doctrine, the acts of a person or 
persons who hold a high level of authority in the company are 
attributed to the company with the result that the law regards such 
persons as having acted as the company. That being the case, it is not the 
                                                                       
10 [1920] 2 KB 497. 
11 [1920] 2 KB 497 at 506. This principle cannot, however, be invoked to protect 
shadow directors as they are not servants of the company: see Stocznia Gdanska SA 
v Latvian Shipping Co [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 537. 
12 G Scammell & Naphew, Ld v Hurley [1928] 1 KB 419; O’Brien v Dawson (1942) 
66 CLR 18. Note, however, that Starke J had in O’Brien v Dawson described the 
allegation of a conspiracy to breach a contract as “a little whimsical” because 
“[a] party who breaks a contract commits an unlawful act, and those who 
knowingly procure its breach also commit an unlawful act whether they act in 
concert or not”: ibid, (1942) 66 CLR 18 at 28. 
13 Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd [1915] AC 705 at 713–714; 
Tesco Ltd v Nattrass [1972] AC 153 at 170–171. 
(2009) 21 SAcLJ Company and Its Directors as Co-conspirators 413 
 
director but the company that has procured its own breach.14 A more 
explicit endorsement of this line of reasoning is seen in O’Brien v 
Dawson,15 where the High Court of Australia held, following Said v Butt, 
that a director who authorised a company’s breach of contract is not, 
without more, liable as a co-conspirator for the breach. In an oft-cited 
passage, Starke J observed:16 
A company ‘cannot act in its own person for it has no person’ … So it 
must of necessity act by directors, managers and other agents. The 
company, if it were guilty of a breach of its contract in this case, acted 
through its director the respondent Doyle, but it is neither ‘law or 
sense’ … to say that Doyle in the exercise of his functions as a director 
of the company combined with it to do any unlawful act or become a 
joint tortfeasor. Again, it is equally fallacious to assert that Doyle 
knowingly procured the company to break its contract. The acts of 
Doyle were the acts of the company and not his personal acts which 
involved him in any liability to the plaintiff. 
7 This line of reasoning has, however, been criticised. Dillon LJ, 
for instance, pointed out in Welsh Development Agency v Export Finance 
Co Ltd17 that the attribution of an agent’s acts to a company did not 
necessarily have the effect of absolving the agent from his own liability. 
Neil Campbell and John Armour termed this the “disattribution 
heresy” – for it improperly assumes that the application of the 
identification doctrine necessarily leads to the exclusion of the agent’s 
personal liability.18 In reality, the identification doctrine serves a more 
limited purpose: 
As a matter of precedent, the identification principle was developed 
solely to attribute the actions or knowledge of corporate agents to a 
company. The cases that developed the principle were concerned 
simply with whether the company was liable for some legal wrong. In 
none of those cases was the agent’s liability in issue, and in none of 
them was there any suggestion that a finding of liability on the 
company’s part necessarily excluded the agent’s liability. 
8 These are cogent observations. The fact that an agent is 
identified with the company for purposes of attributing an act or state 
of mind to the company is not, by itself, a sufficient reason for 
exonerating the agent. The attribution theory is not, therefore, 
a convincing justification for the rule in Said v Butt. 
                                                                       
14 Said v Butt [1920] 2 KB 497 at 505–506. 
15 (1942) 66 CLR 18. 
16 (1942) 66 CLR 18 at 32. 
17 [1992] BCC 270 at 288 
18 N Campbell & J Armour, “Demystifying the Civil Liability of Corporate Agents” 
(2003) 62 CLJ 290 at 293. 
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9 But there is a second reason for the rule. In Said v Butt, 
McCardie J observed that the “gravest and widest consequences”19 would 
ensue if the defendant director were held liable for procuring the 
company’s contractual breach. One such consequence would be to 
render the director liable for tortious damages which, being at large, may 
well exceed damages for breach of contract. Another consequence would 
be the unacceptable proliferation of actions. No less than three distinct 
causes of action would arise if the plaintiff ’s claim were to succeed, viz, 
an action against the company for breach of contract, a second action 
against the defendant in tort for procuring the company’s breach, and 
finally, a third action against the company which would be vicariously 
liable for the defendant’s tort.20 The last-mentioned action would be 
odd, for the company is effectively liable for procuring its own breach.21 
That these are pertinent considerations suggest that the true rationale of 
the rule in Said v Butt lies essentially in policy considerations. In ADGA 
Systems International Ltd v Valcom Ltd,22 a decision of the Ontario Court 
of Appeal, Carthy JA summed up the practical significance of Said v Butt 
in the following words:23 
[Said v Butt has] has since gained acceptance because it assures that 
persons who deal with a limited company and accept the imposition 
of limited liability will not have available to them both a claim for 
breach of contract against a company and a claim for tortious conduct 
against the director with damages assessed on a different basis. … [It] 
also assures that officers and directors, in the process of carrying on 
business, are capable of directing that a contract of employment be 
terminated or that a business contract not be performed on the 
assumed basis that the company’s best interest is to pay the damages 
for failure to perform. 
10 These observations suggest (correctly, it is submitted) that the 
central concern of the Said v Butt rule is to ensure that company 
directors and officers are free to make decisions on the company’s behalf 
without the fear of improper and vexatious legal suits so long as they act 
in good faith in the company’s interests. Such an environment is 
conducive, perhaps even critical, for the efficacious conduct of 
commerce.24 
11 But whilst the facilitation of commerce calls for the protection 
of directors and officers from ill-founded claims, such protection cannot 
be unqualified. In particular, the pursuit of business efficacy should not 
undermine the cardinal principle that each person is answerable for his 
                                                                       
19 [1920] 2 KB 497 at 504. 
20 [1920] 2 KB 497 at 504. 
21 See Idoport Pty Ltd v Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 328 at [22]. 
22 (1999) 43 OR (3d) 101. 
23 (1999) 43 OR (3d) 101 at 106. 
24 (1999) 43 OR (3d) 101 at 104. 
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own wrong. For this reason, McCardie J stressed in Said v Butt that only 
a servant or agent who has acted bona fide within the scope of his 
authority would enjoy immunity from personal liability.25 Where he does 
not so act, the agent is more appropriately regarded as a stranger to the 
company’s deed and may therefore incur personal liability for the same. 
Subsequent decisions have not, however, found this exception easy to 
apply. But more will be said of that later.26 
12 In Singapore, Said v Butt has been endorsed by the High Court 
in Chong Hon Kuan Ivan v Levy Maurice27 (“Chong Hon Kuan”). Here, 
the plaintiff ’s appointment as the managing director of the company 
was prematurely terminated by a resolution approved by the company’s 
board of directors at a meeting. The plaintiff thus instituted a suit 
against the company as well as several of its directors, alleging, inter alia, 
that the directors had conspired to induce the company’s breach of 
contract. On the authority of Said v Butt, the defendant directors 
succeeded in striking out the pleadings on the alleged conspiracy. 
Significantly, the plaintiff did not seek to undermine the correctness of 
Said v Butt. Instead, the parties’ arguments centred on the ambit of the 
rule. Citing the obiter dicta of Porter J in De Jetley Marks v Greenword 
(Lord),28 the plaintiff argued that Said v Butt should only apply to 
protect directors’ deliberations at board meetings and not conduct 
undertaken before such meetings. Unsurprisingly, this suggestion did 
not find favour with the court. Such a distinction was, in Woo Bih Li J’s 
view,29 entirely artificial. Rather, the more pertinent question was 
“whether what was done by the directors was outside the scope of their 
office … [and] that the servant must have acted bona fide”.30 
13 The decision in Chong Hon Kuan plainly regarded the principle 
in Said v Butt to be applicable in Singapore. In deciding whether a 
director is liable for having conspired with his company in authorising 
the company’s breach of a contractual obligation, the relevant question 
is whether the director has acted bona fide within the scope of his 
authority. A different focus was, however, endorsed in the more recent 
decisions of Nagase and Lim Leong Huat. In those two cases, the 
                                                                       
25 See para 5 of this article. 
26 See discussion in Part III of this article. 
27 [2004] 4 SLR 801. 
28 See [1936] 1 All ER 863 at 872–873: “There is force in this argument [ie, the rule in 
Said v Butt], and I think that directors in a board meeting could not induce or 
conspire to induce that meeting to break a contract – at any rate, not without 
malice. But I think that some at any rate, if not all, of the directors could conspire, 
before the board meeting was held, to induce the board as a whole wrongfully to break 
a contract by dismissing one of the company’s servants. The matter, however, is a 
difficult one and I prefer to express no final opinion upon it.” [emphasis added] 
29 [2004] 4 SLR 801 at [43]. 
30 [2004] 4 SLR 801 at [43]. 
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spotlight was placed largely on the conceptual possibility of finding a 
combination or agreement between a company and its alter ego, whilst 
Said v Butt was considered only as a subsidiary issue. The risk of such an 
approach lies in its tendency to encourage the same specious reasoning 
that underpinned the “disattribution heresy”. It assumes that the 
attribution of a director’s acts or thoughts to a company for one or 
some purposes necessarily has a bearing on the allocation of 
responsibility (as between the company and its director) in other 
circumstances. There is, as we have seen,31 no basis for this assumption. 
Furthermore, such an approach obscures the real enquiry that should 
have been made, ie, whether germane policy reasons exist to justify the 
imposition of personal liability on the director. 
III. The decisions in Nagase and Lim Leong Huat 
14 In Nagase, the dispute arose out of a contract between the 
plaintiff and the second defendant, D Logistics Pte Ltd (“D Logistics”), 
under which D Logistics rendered warehousing and logistics services to 
the plaintiff at specified rates. Several years later, the plaintiff discovered 
that D Logistics had, for the larger part of their alliance, overcharged for 
its services. At the main trial,32 it was established that D Logistics had 
imposed excessive charges by inflating both the volume and weight of 
the cargo stored at its warehouse.33 That being the case, D Logistics was 
found to be in breach of the contract34 and liable to repay the excess 
charges. But that was not the end of the matter as the plaintiff had also 
sought recovery from the first defendant, David Ching (“DC”), “the 
moving spirit and alter ego”35 of D Logistics. The alleged basis of 
recovery was that D Logistics, DC and two of the plaintiff ’s employees 
had conspired to overcharge the plaintiff. On the evidence adduced, this 
allegation failed because the two employees were not found to have been 
acting in concert with DC and D Logistics. However, Judith Prakash J 
(the presiding judge) then proceeded to consider whether DC and 
                                                                       
31 See para 7 of this article. 
32 Nagase Singapore Pte Ltd v Ching Kai Huat [2007] 3 SLR 265. 
33 [2007] 3 SLR 265 at [104], [111] and [154]. 
34 Ordinarily, a claimant who has paid in excess of contractual rates could have 
sought restitution for the excess charges without relying on a breach of contract. In 
this case, the court appeared to have assumed (perhaps on account of the plaintiff’s 
pleadings) that the inflation of tonnage volume and weight would itself amount to 
a breach of the term specifying the applicable rates. Or that D Logistics owed an 
implied duty not to charge more than the actual tonnage volume and net weight of 
the cargo stored at its premises. The plaintiff appeared also to have pleaded (see 
[2007] 3 SLR 265 at [10]) that D Logistics had breached the implied duty to take 
care in the preparation of its invoices and bills so as to avoid overcharging the 
plaintiff. But a mere failure to exercise care would not be an adequate basis for 
establishing conspiracy because the tort is constituted only by intentional conduct. 
35 [2007] 3 SLR 265 at [162]. 
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D Logistics, in the absence of the employees’ involvement, could be 
liable for having conspired to overcharge the plaintiff. Her Honour 
found that DC was clearly responsible for D Logistics’ breaches because, 
as the directing mind and will of D Logistics, he must have been privy to 
the latter’s deliberate and consistent decisions to inflate charges.36 But 
while the fact of DC’s involvement is not in doubt, Prakash J 
nevertheless accepted that this argument runs into a plausible legal 
objection, ie, whether it is conceptually permissible for a company to 
conspire with its alter ego. Since the plaintiff had not specifically 
addressed this difficulty in its submissions, Prakash J adjourned her 
decision until full submissions had been made on this point. 
15 At the subsequent hearing,37 Prakash J concluded that a 
company could in law be held to have conspired with its sole controlling 
director to injure a third person even if that director were the company’s 
moving spirit.38 Implicit support for this conclusion was found in Chew 
Kong Huat v Ricwil (Singapore) Ptd Ltd,39 where the Court of Appeal 
upheld a finding that a company (“Sintalow”) had conspired with its 
controlling director (“Chew”) to injure the plaintiff (“Ricwil”) by 
unlawful means. The unlawful means employed in that case involved the 
breach by Chew (also a director of Ricwil) of his fiduciary duties to 
Ricwil by diverting contracts from Ricwil to Sintalow. This result, 
Prakash J reasoned,40 must be taken as a clear rejection of the conceptual 
objection to treating the company and its alter ego as separate persons 
for the purposes of conspiracy. Substantial reliance was also placed on 
Taylor v Smyth,41 a decision of the Irish Supreme Court that categorically 
held that a sole controlling director could, in principle, be liable for 
conspiring with the company he controls.42 At least two reasons could be 
discerned from McCarthy J’s observations in Taylor v Smyth, which were 
cited by Prakash J with approval.43 First, there is no logical reason why a 
director who is in control of a limited company should be granted 
immunity from suit if he has (through the company) established an 
arrangement that benefitted himself and the company to the detriment 
of others.44 Secondly, to insist that a company could not conspire with its 
controlling director would lead to the invidious result that “the assets of 
a limited company should not be liable to answer for conspiracy where 
                                                                       
36 [2007] 3 SLR 265 at [162]. 
37 [2008] 1 SLR 80. 
38 [2008] 1 SLR 80 at [22]. 
39 [2000] 1 SLR 385. 
40 [2008] 1 SLR 80 at [11] and [21]. 
41 [1991] 1 IR 142. 
42 Citing Belmont Finance (No 1) v Williams Furniture [1979] Ch 250 in support: see 
[1991] 1 IR 142 at 165–166. 
43 [2008] 1 SLR 80 at [20]–[21]. 
44 [1991] 1 IR 142 at 166. 
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its assets had been augmented as a result of the action alleged to 
constitute the conspiracy”.45 
16 Notably, Prakash J distinguished both Said v Butt and Chong 
Hon Kuan from Nagase. Accepting plaintiff counsel’s argument (and 
without examining the relevant law in any detail), the learned judge held 
that the principle in Said v Butt did not apply to cases where the director 
had conspired by employing illegal means.46 This occurred in Nagase, 
where the defendants had deliberately overcharged the plaintiff. Having 
been privy to these illegitimate charges, DC could not be said to have 
acted in a bona fide manner within the scope of his authority. Chong 
Hon Kuan, on the other hand, was distinguished on the ground that the 
conspiracy alleged therein was amongst three directors of a company 
and that the company was not itself an alleged party to the conspiracy.47 
That was not, therefore, a case which had specifically considered 
whether a single controlling director could conspire with his company. 
The discussion that follows will, however, attempt to demonstrate that 
this is a distinction without merit.48 
17 In the subsequent decision of Lim Leong Huat, Andrew Ang J 
substantially endorsed the reasoning and outcome in Nagase, affirming 
the proposition that a company and its sole controlling director could in 
law be liable as co-conspirators.49 This, in Ang J’s view, is no more than a 
logical consequence of the elementary understanding of the company as 
a separate legal construct.50 Thus, the learned judge observed:51 “[if] the 
company and its controlling mind could enter into a contract of 
service, … there is no reason, on principle, why there cannot be a 
combination of the company and its controlling mind and an 
understanding or agreement between them to constitute a conspiracy.” 
18 Unlike Prakash J, however, Ang J did not think Chong Hon Kuan 
was irrelevant to the question whether a single controlling director 
could conspire with his company.52 Instead, his Honour reasoned that 
                                                                       
45 [1991] 1 IR 142 at 165. This does not seem relevant in Nagase, where the 
company’s primary liability for breach of contract is not in doubt: see para 3 of this 
article. 
46 [2008] 1 SLR 80 at [9]. 
47 [2008] 1 SLR 80 at [10]. 
48 See para 21 of this article. 
49 Lim Leong Huat v Chip Hup Hup Kee Construction Pte Ltd [2009] 2 SLR 318 at [22] 
and [29]. Unlike Nagase, this decision was not concerned with the substantive 
liability of the director but with a preliminary application to amend pleadings. 
Nevertheless, the judgment is important for its extensive discussion on a director’s 
liability for civil conspiracy. 
50 Citing Saloman v A Saloman & Co Ltd [1896] AC 22 and Catherine Lee v Lee’s Air 
Farming Ltd [1960] 3 WLR 758 in support: see [2009] 2 SLR 318 at [27]–[29]. 
51 [2009] 2 SLR 318 at [29]. 
52 [2009] 2 SLR 318 at [31]–[32]. 
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since the tort of conspiracy by unlawful means does require the 
conspirator to have acted with the intention to harm the victim (though 
this need not be his predominant purpose), it is difficult to see how a 
director who has acted bona fide within his authority could be liable for 
conspiracy. This, in Ang J’s view, was the position affirmed by Chong 
Hon Kuan through its endorsement of Said v Butt:53 
… Chong Hon Kuan could be said to have reduced the proposition in 
Said v Butt to the following – a claim of conspiracy against an 
individual director must fail where the director is acting bona fide and 
within the scope of his authority. Whether the director has acted in a 
bona fide manner within the scope of his authority must be relevant in 
evaluating whether such director had the intention or purpose to injure 
the plaintiff. Where a director acts bona fide within the scope of his 
authority but nevertheless causes damage or injury to a plaintiff, it 
cannot easily be said (with a view to establishing conspiracy) that he 
had the requisite intention or purpose to injure or damage the 
plaintiff. [emphasis added] 
19 Framed in these terms, Ang J appears to have construed the 
principle in Said v Butt as no more than a corollary of the requirement 
for intention to harm. With respect, however, this appears to conflate 
two distinct mental elements. The bona fide element in Said v Butt is 
essentially concerned with the good faith of directors in the conduct of 
the company’s affairs.54 The relevant mental state is thus that which the 
director bears vis-à-vis the company (or its interests). For the tort of 
conspiracy, however, the requisite intention is that which the 
conspirator possesses towards the third party victim. Contrary to Ang J’s 
statement above, it is not inconsistent for a director acting bona fide 
within the scope of his authority to intend the injury of a third party. 
Said v Butt was such a case. Assuming, as McCardie J did in that case,55 
that the plaintiff had a valid contract which the theatre company 
breached under the instruction of the defendant managing director, 
there could be no question that the defendant intended to injure the 
plaintiff by depriving him of the benefit of the contract. At the same 
time, the defendant was undoubtedly acting bona fide in protection of 
the company’s interests.56 Thus, to exempt the defendant from tortious 
liability under the principle in Said v Butt is not to deny that the 
defendant intended the plaintiff ’s harm, but only that the law regards it 
as legitimate, for specific policy reasons, to countenance the defendant’s 
conduct in such circumstances. 
                                                                       
53 [2009] 2 SLR 318 at [35]. 
54 Stocznia Gdanska SA v Latvian Shipping Co [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 537 at [289](c). 
55 [1920] 2 KB 497 at 503. 
56 [1920] 2 KB 497 at 504. 
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20 Nevertheless, Ang J was right in his observation that the 
reasoning in Chong Hon Kuan was relevant to the issue in Nagase. This 
observation is, however, justified by a reason different from that 
identified by the learned judge. At its crux, the issue in Nagase was 
whether a director should personally account for the contractual 
liability incurred by the company. The principle in Said v Butt, 
unequivocally adopted in Chong Hon Kuan, directly addresses this issue. 
21 At common law, a number of English authorities57 have long 
assumed that a company could conspire with its directors. Is this 
capacity altered just because the alleged conspiracy is that between the 
company and its sole alter ego? Plainly not. However numerous or scarce 
the human agents involved, the company remains an inanimate legal 
construct devoid of a natural mind. To say that a company could 
“conspire” with its directors is to conclude that the law ought to attribute 
liability to both the corporate entity and its human agents. This 
conclusion is not contingent on the number of agents involved. Nor is it 
relevant whether the company was sued as a co-conspirator. Viewed in 
this light, Nagase had erred in singling out the situation of a sole 
controlling director as one that merits special consideration. 
22 Moreover, the holding that there was no conceptual 
impediment to the finding of a conspiracy between a company and its 
alter ego does not actually explain why it is right to impose tortious 
liability on a director whose conduct has already been attributed to the 
company. It is no answer to say that such liability is justified because the 
company is a separate legal person that could conspire with the director. 
No magic inheres in the term “legal person”. The company’s persona is a 
creation of the law, and its consequences determined by principles and 
policies. Even though the company is accorded some “human” liberties 
in specific contexts, such as the ability to contract and bear liability in its 
own name, it is clearly not equated with a natural person in all 
circumstances. So a director who “conspires”, or more appropriately, 
causes a company’s breach of contract is not necessarily in the same 
position as one who has procured another human agent’s breach of 
contract. In each context where an attempt is made to assert or suppress 
the company’s distinctiveness, a close scrutiny of the underlying reasons 
is called for. Like Said v Butt, the issue in Nagase could only be resolved 
by mediating the relevant but conflicting policy concerns.58 In general, 
a director who acts on the company’s behalf does not incur personal 
liability for the act but this protection is curtailed where a director who 
has not acted in a bona fide manner within the scope of his authority. 
                                                                       
57 Belmont Finance Corp Ltd v Williams Furniture Ltd [1979] Ch 250; Yukong Line Ltd 
of Korea v Rendsburg Investments Corp of Liberia (No 2) [1998] 1 WLR 294. 
58 See Root Quality Pty Ltd v Root Control Technologies Pty Ltd (2000) 1777 ALR 231 
at [137]. 
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Applied to the facts of Nagase, the crucial enquiry would simply have 
been whether DC, the company’s alter ego, had in fact acted bona fide 
within the scope of his authority. 
IV. The limits of Said v Butt 
23 Although Prakash J had distinguished Chong Hon Kuan (which 
applied Said v Butt) from Nagase, the learned judge did nevertheless 
separately observe that the principle in Said v Butt would not have 
protected the defendant, DC, from personal liability because he had not 
acted in good faith in authorising the company’s breaches. On the facts 
of Nagase, this conclusion is eminently sensible. To understand why this 
is so, it is necessary to examine the “bona fide within scope of authority” 
qualification of the Said v Butt rule. 
24 Even though the qualification is well established, its precise 
meaning remains uncertain. Two particular difficulties have been 
encountered. The first relates to the meaning of “bona fide”, and the 
second raises the question whether the “bona fide” and “acting within 
scope of authority” requirements should be construed as conjunctives or 
disjunctives. 
A. Bona fide 
25 In Otech Pakistan Pvt Ltd v Clough Engineering Ltd, Kan Ting 
Chiu J took the view that the director’s “bona fide” is, in this context, 
assessed with strict reference to his office, such that:59 
When the allegation is that the defendant had conspired to and had 
induced the breach qua director, that, without more, must imply that 
the defendant had been acting bona fide and within the scope of his 
office. ‘Bona fide’ here is to be taken to mean that the defendant was 
acting in good faith in the discharge of his office, and not that he was 
acting in good faith in the action complained of; a director may believe 
that it is for the good of the company to breach a contract intentionally. 
In such a situation, the principle [in Said v Butt] would operate to defeat 
the claim against the defendant as a matter of law. [emphasis added] 
26 To the extent that the focus of the enquiry is on the acts 
committed by the defendant in his capacity as a director, it is surely 
correct. But the suggestion that a director who has acted in his capacity 
as a director must be presumed to have acted in good faith and within 
the scope of his duty is more obscure and, hence, less compelling. For it 
is entirely conceivable that a director may purport to discharge his duty 
as a director without also acting in good faith. This may explain why a 
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further gloss on the concept of “bona fide” was thought necessary in 
Ridgeway Maritime Inc v Beulah Wings Ltd (“The Leon”).60 In that case, 
Waller J interpreted “not acting bona fide” to mean no more than that 
the director must himself have been guilty of some unlawful act. The 
learned judge reasoned as follows:61 
There certainly are well known circumstances in which an employee 
may be liable for inducing a breach of contract where the employee is 
himself acting unlawfully including in breach of his own contract with 
his employer. Mr Joseph suggested (following Clerk & Lindsell) that if 
the employee or director were not acting ‘bona fide’ then he could be 
liable for procuring a breach. I find the words ‘bona fide’, if they are 
meant to add anything to acting unlawfully, quite difficult in this context. 
Do they contemplate that an individual who knows that what he is 
doing will lead to the company being in breach of contract being 
somebody not acting bona fide? Or do the words bona fide relate to 
the relationship of the individual with the company ie if he is seeking 
to force the company to do something contrary to its own interests? If 
the latter, I am not satisfied that without the action of the employee also 
being in breach of contract or legal duty to the employer, it could found 
an action in tort for inducing breach of contract. [emphasis added] 
27 This restrictive view is consistent with the essential rationale of 
the Said v Butt rule. A director who knowingly authorises the company’s 
contractual breach should not, for that reason alone, be regarded as not 
having acted bona fide in the company’s interests. If the law were 
otherwise, a director would find himself in an invidious position where 
he could not advance the company’s interests without being placed at 
risk of incurring personal liability for his decision. Marshall JA makes 
the point forcefully in the Canadian decision Imperial Oil Ltd v C&G 
Holdings Ltd:62 
Where, in the opinion of a director, the interests of the company 
would be best served by breaking its contractual commitments, he or 
she is entitled, if not obliged, to cause the company to do so. The 
tortious act is not considered that of the individual director but of the 
company against whom the aggrieved party may seek remedy for 
breach. Therefore, the self same act knowingly and intentionally 
committed, which will expose a third party who was otherwise a 
stranger to the contract to liability for wrongful contractual 
interference, may not incur liability for a directors of a company. 
Indeed it may well be undertaken in the exercise of the director’s duty. 
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28 If the interpretation in The Leon is accepted,63 the English 
approach to the rule in Said v Butt may now be restated as follows. First, 
a director who authorises or procures his company’s breach of contract 
will enjoy the protection of the Said v Butt rule if his decision is made 
with a view to promote the company’s interests. Secondly, this immunity 
will be lost if, in doing so, he commits a breach of a personal legal or 
contractual duty. Such unlawful conduct may include, for instance, 
a breach of the director’s fiduciary duty to the company, as may occur 
where a director has acted to advance his own or another’s interests 
rather than the best interests of the company,64 or where his conduct is 
akin to fraud.65 By insisting on proof of some independently unlawful 
conduct on the part of the director, this approach precludes any attempt 
to affix personal liability on a director whose only wrong is having acted 
with malice or ill motive towards the claimant. This is consistent with 
the general approach in the law of tort, where malice, without more, is 
not a sufficient cause of action.66 Yet another implication of this 
interpretation of “bona fide” is that a company and its directors can 
never be liable on account of simple conspiracy (or conspiring with the 
predominant intention to commit a lawful act) because a director will 
only be implicated if he is himself guilty of some legal wrong. Again, this 
appears right as it underscores the essential premise of the rule in Said v 
Butt, that mere complicity between a company and its directors is not a 
sufficient ground for imposing personal liability on a director. 
29 The approach taken by Prakash J in Nagase may be understood 
as being consistent with that suggested by Waller J in The Leon. It will be 
recalled that in Nagase, the defendant director (DC) could not rely on 
the rule in Said v Butt because, having been privy to and authorised the 
company’s deliberate overcharging, he could not be regarded as having 
acted bona fide in discharging his duties to the company. His conduct 
was akin to fraud67 and hence illegal. On that count, imposing personal 
liability on DC was no more than an application of the principle that 
each individual is liable for his own wrong. 
B. Conjunctives or disjunctives? 
30 In Chong Hon Kuan,68 Woo J stated that the qualification to the 
Said v Butt rule comprises conjunctives, ie, that a director does not incur 
                                                                       
63 This does not appear to be settled law. Recent decisions have continued to doubt 
the proper meaning of the “acting bona fide within the scope of his authority” 
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personal liability if he has acted bona fide and done so within the scope 
of his authority. No particular reason was, however, cited for this view. 
In Australia, the (unreported) decision in Idoport Pty Ltd v National 
Australia Bank Ltd69 (“Idoport”) appears to support the contrary view. In 
that case, the plaintiffs had alleged, inter alia, that two companies within 
the same group had breached their respective contractual commitments, 
and that various directors of the said companies had procured these 
breaches. The directors pleaded Said v Butt in defence, to which the 
plaintiffs argued that this defence would only apply if the directors’ 
conduct in procuring the company’s breach fell within their actual 
authority but not when the authority was only of an ostensible nature.70 
The learned judge disagreed, holding that a director was entitled to the 
protection of the Said v Butt rule so long as he has acted within (actual 
or ostensible) authority, even if in doing so he had failed to advance the 
company’s interests.71 A director who has compromised the company’s 
interests would be liable to the company for the breach of his fiduciary 
or corporate duties but that does not, in Einstein J’s view, alter the fact 
that the acts of contracting and breach were those of the company and of 
it alone:72 
On principle and by definition as long as the acts of such a director were 
acts within authority, the director cannot be said to have acted 
otherwise than as the alter ego of the company on who’s board he sat 
at the time when the material decisions were made … On principle 
and by definition, the director in those posited situations is simply not 
acting in a personal capacity or otherwise than as the alter ego of the 
company which is said to have engaged in the subject conduct said to 
constitute the tort. [emphasis added] 
31 Obviously, the distinction between the conjunctive and 
disjunctive approaches is of significance only if one of the two 
requirements is absent. In a case where a director has acted bona fide, 
but outside the actual authority conferred on him by the company, he is 
protected by the Said v Butt rule under the disjunctive approach but not 
the conjunctive approach. However, if one understands “bona fide” as 
expounded by Waller J in The Leon, then this is in all likelihood a very 
improbable scenario because the director who has acted outside his 
authority is in any event in breach of his legal and/or contractual duty 
                                                                       
69 [2001] NSWSC 328 at [65]. Cf the Canadian decision Imperial Oil Ltd v C&G Ltd 
(1989) 62 DLR (4th) 261 at 266, where it was suggested that personal liability does 
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acted bona fide. Instead, liability will only be imposed “upon affirmative proof that 
the dominating purpose of the director’s act was aimed at depriving the aggrieved 
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70 [2001] NSWSC 328 at [35]. 
71 [2001] NSWSC 328 at [65]. 
72 [2001] NSWSC 328 at [40]. 
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to the company and hence not regarded as bona fide under Waller J’s 
definition. 
32 This then leaves just one other scenario in which the distinction 
between the two approaches still matters. And that is the scenario 
considered in Idoport itself, where the director has not acted bona fide 
but well within the scope of his authority.73 As we have seen,74 Einstein J 
did not think such a director should be personally liable for the 
company’s breach. In that case, the directors’ lack of bona fides was 
founded on the allegation that they had preferred the interests of other 
group companies to the prejudice of the company in which they were 
appointed directors. On these facts, the case for holding a director 
personally accountable for the company’s breach may not have appeared 
overwhelming, for the mediation of the nominee director’s conflicting 
duties is notoriously intractable. But the deficiency of the disjunctive 
approach is apparent on more extreme facts, such as those in Nagase. 
The director’s actual authority was not in question in that case because 
the company was effectively controlled by DC. At all material times, the 
excess charges were, with DC’s approval, unmistakably the acts of the 
company. However, it was equally clear that DC was not, in endorsing 
the deception, acting bona fide. A director such as DC should not 
therefore escape personal responsibility on the ground that his act was 
authorised by the company. This suggests, therefore, that there are 
occasions when a director ought to be denied the protection of the Said 
v Butt rule, regardless of whether he was acting within or outside the 
authority of his office. 
33 What emerges from the foregoing is first, and more 
straightforwardly, that the “acting bona fide within the scope of his 
authority” qualifier does not comprise two disjunctive elements; and 
second, which is more significant, that the qualifier does not comprise 
two elements at all. At its core, the qualifier seeks to distinguish between 
situations where the director is acting merely as an agent of the 
company, and those where he is (or deemed to be) acting in his personal 
capacity. The notion “bona fide” achieves this by confining the 
application of Said v Butt to situations where the director has complied 
                                                                       
73 This does, of course, raise a very difficult question as to whether a director who has 
not acted bona fide has thereby also acted outside the authority conferred by the 
company. In the Idoport case, Eistein J was firmly of the view that these raised two 
completely distinct issues, ie, that a breach of director’s duty is a matter between 
the company and the director which, unlike the question of authority, has no 
impact on the director’s authority to act on the company’s behalf: see [2001] 
NSWSC 328 at [37]. In Criterion Properties plc v Stratford UK LLC [2004] 
1 WLR 1846, however, Lord Scott appears to have implicitly accepted (at [31]) that 
a director’s lack of authority may be inferred from conduct that is clearly contrary 
to the company’s interests. 
74 See para 30 of this article. 
426 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (2009) 21 SAcLJ 
 
with his personal legal obligations. The issue of authority is one facet of 
such legality and thus conceptually indistinct from the “bona fide” 
requirement. Conversely, a director is not exonerated merely because his 
conduct has been authorised by the company, since a director who acts 
with due authority may nevertheless be in breach of a serious personal 
obligation to the company. In summary, therefore, the concept “bona 
fide” alone delineates the limits of the Said v Butt rule. A director who 
has not acted in a bona fide manner cannot seek refuge under the rule 
whether or not he has also acted in excess of authority.75 
V. Contract versus Tort 
34 In the interests of completeness, it is useful to note that apart 
from the “bona fide” qualification, the principle in Said v Butt is also 
limited in its application to situations involving a breach by the 
company of its contractual obligations. Where the alleged injury results 
from a tort, the principle generally does not absolve the director from 
liability. Such injury may arise in two ways. First, the director may 
himself be the perpetrator of the tort. McCardie J made it clear in Said v 
Butt that such a director remains personally liable for his own tort:76 
I abstain from expressing any opinion as to the law which may apply if 
a servant, acting as an entire stranger, procures his master to 
wrongfully break a contract with a third person. Nothing that I have 
said to-day is, I hope, inconsistent with the rule that a director or a 
servant who actually takes part in or actually authorizes such torts as 
assault, trespass to property, nuisance, or the like may be liable in 
damages as a joint participant in one of such recognized heads of 
tortious wrong. 
35 This observation reinforces Waller J’s interpretation of “bona 
fide” in The Leon. A director who perpetrates a tort in the course of 
discharging his responsibilities doubtlessly commits a legal wrong and 
cannot therefore be regarded as having acted bona fide in the company’s 
interests. Such a director cannot escape liability by hiding behind the 
company. 
36 Secondly, the company may itself be directly liable for a tort 
constituted by the acts of agents or servants who are not also directors of 
the company. Here, the governing principle is that a director is liable for 
the tort if he has authorised, directed or procured the same.77 In this 
                                                                       
75 This interpretation of the “bona fide within the scope of his authority” was raised 
but not considered in Reeves v Sprecher [2008] BCC 49. 
76 [1920] 2 KB 497 at 506. 
77 C Evans & Sons Ltd v Spritebrand Ltd [1985] 1 WLR 316; C Gabriel Peter & Partners 
v Wee Chong Jin [1998] 1 SLR 374; TV Media Pte Ltd v De Cruz Andrea Heidi 
[2004] 3 SLR 543. 
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context, unlike that involving the breach of a company’s contract, the 
director’s act of authorisation or procurement is a sufficient ground for 
imposing liability on the director. This means, in effect, that the law 
considers the director’s involvement in the two contexts to be 
qualitatively distinct – a point acknowledged by Waller J in The Leon:78 
It is relatively easy to see that some complicity in the commission of 
the tort may and should render an individual liable, but it is certainly 
not right that simple complicity in a breach of contact should render 
that individual liable. 
37 It is not hard to see why this may be so. Where an attempt is 
made to attribute personal liability to a director for the breach of a 
company’s contractual undertaking, the case for a presumption against 
such liability is compelling because it is consistent with the ordinary 
incidence of the privity rule. Since a contract is made between the 
company and a third party, the third party’s recourse in the event of 
breach is ordinarily limited to the company alone.79 But a person injured 
by a company’s tort is likely to be in a vastly different position. Take the 
stock example where a director authorises a negligent course of 
operation that results in the physical injury of a passer-by. Since the 
third party victim has not in any meaningful sense consented to deal 
with the company, he is a complete stranger and there is thus no 
obvious reason for confining responsibility to the company. On the 
contrary, the law’s usual response in such circumstance is to attribute 
responsibility to all actors who are personally implicated in the tort. 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, attempts to extend the application of the Said 
v Butt rule to situations in which directors are allegedly involved in the 
company’s tortious wrongdoing have largely been resisted.80 
38 It is interesting to note that in Canada, the suggestion has been 
to abstract a more general principle from this divergent treatment of 
tort and contract cases. This was stated by Carthy JA in ADGA Systems 
International Ltd v Valcom Ltd in the following terms:81 
… that a jurisprudential division line might be drawn between those 
who contract with the company, or voluntarily deal with it, and can be 
taken to have accepted limited liability, and strangers to the company 
whose only concern is not to be harmed by the conduct of others. On 
                                                                       
78 The Leon [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 611 at 624, per Waller J. 
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that theory, those harmed as strangers to the corporate body naturally 
look for liability to the persons who caused the harm and those who 
have in some manner accepted limited liability in their dealings with 
the company would be limited in recourse to the company, 
39 Although this suggestion has not, to this author’s knowledge, 
been adopted in Canada, it does raise a point that merits serious 
consideration. If the rationale of this contract-tort divide does indeed lie 
in the phenomenon of assent, then the rule in Said v Butt should by 
logical extension also apply in those instances where the tort arises in 
the context of a consensual relationship, eg, where a breach of contract 
gives rise to concurrent actions in both contract and tort.82 Such a 
development may, however, appear less attractive if the notion of 
consent should extend beyond contractual relations. 
VI. Conclusion 
40 The suggestion that a company could conspire with its directors 
is a tantalising one. Indeed, this brief review of the relevant case law 
does not dispute the possibility of such a combination. However, it is 
crucial to appreciate that the analysis of an alleged conspiracy between a 
company and its directors raises considerations that are different from 
that of an alleged conspiracy between human actors. The analysis in the 
corporate context comprises an additional and critical dimension, and 
that is the fair and principled allocation of responsibility between the 
corporate entity and the human agent. In the view of this author, this 
allocation can only be achieved by a careful appraisal of the relevant 
policy concerns. A decision that is sensitive to this reality will, by clearly 
articulating the interplay of such policy considerations, minimise 
obfuscation and promote certainty in the law. 
 
                                                                       
82 This approach may also explain Williams v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd [1998] 
1 WLR 830, where it was held that a director would not be personally liable for a 
company’s negligent misstatement unless he had personally assumed responsibility 
for the same. Although the plaintiff was wronged by the company’s tort 
(ie, negligent misstatement), the claim was nevertheless closely connected to a 
contract because the misstatement was made for the purpose of, and did succeed 
in, inducing, a contract. Therefore, the plaintiff had at all material times 
appreciated that he was dealing exclusively with the company and thus the 
argument for the director’s complicity was much less compelling. 
